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INTRODUCTION
Each year banks are the targets of insider and outsider fraudu-
lent activity. Borrowers overstate their assets and holdings in order to
obtain loans for which they would never otherwise qualify." Employees
embezzle, steal, or conspire with crooked clients for a kickback, and
billions are lost.2 Law enforcement agencies around the world are re-
porting increased instances of corporate, mortgage, and bank fraud.
For example, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations
("FBI") in its FY2007 Financial Crimes Report states that its corporate
fraud cases doubled from five years earlier.3 Through FY2007, U.S.
Grand Juries returned 183 indictments resulting in 173 convictions.4
Securities and commodities fraud cases increased from 937 cases in
2002 to 1,217 in 2007.5 With the increased attention, mortgage fraud is
getting in the wake of the mortgage default crisis, the FBI in FY2008
had 1,204 cases under investigation, got 321 indictments, and 260 con-
victions.6 The number of mortgage fraud investigations has tripled
over the last five-year period.7 In FY2007, the FBI's health care fraud
cases alone produced $1.12 billion in restitution orders.8 Corporate
fraud alone in the United States amounts to over $1 billion per year.9
Denying the criminal the fruits of his unlawful enterprise is one
of law enforcement's main deterrents. To accomplish this, financial in-
stitutions, regulators, and law enforcement must be able to follow and
find the ill-gotten assets and get them back, which is not an easy task.
Even when assets are found, stumbling blocks often keep private par-
ties from seizing them.
1. See generally Bank Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (enacted in response to
fraud committed on financial institutions by borrowers who misstate information in order to
obtain loans).
2. J. Alex Heroy, Other People's Money: How a Time-Gap in Credit Reporting May
Lead to Fraud, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 321, 322 (2008). Mortgage fraud alone in 2006 has




6. Financial Crimes 2008, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/
fcs-report2008 (last visited Sep. 21, 2017).
7. Id.
8. Financial Crimes Report 2007, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/
fcs-report2007 (last visited Sep. 21, 2017).
9. Id. This estimate is separate and in addition to mortgage fraud, health care fraud
and securities fraud. Id.
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I. BANK FRAuD LAws IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND
The primary law regulating bank fraud in the U.S. is the Bank
Fraud Statute.10 Four other U.S. laws dealing with bank fraud are the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") 1 and the Bank
Secrecy Act ("BSA").
The Bank Fraud Statute ("BFS") criminalized a variety of
schemes intended to defraud federally insured financial institutions.12
The BFS covers numerous offenses against banks and lending institu-
tions including check-kiting, check forging, false statements, non-
disclosures and misrepresentations on loan applications, stolen checks,
unauthorized use of ATMs, credit card fraud, student loan fraud, false
transactions between offshore "shell" banks and domestic banks, sub-
mission of fraudulent credit card receipts, and false statements
intended to induce check cashing.13 Yet, the BFS is not without its lim-
itations as it does not cover money laundering, bribery of bank officials,
and fraud committed by financial institutions to its customers.14 Con-
victions under the BFS carry a fine of up to one million dollars and a
maximum term of imprisonment of thirty years.15
In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act
("BSA").' 6 The BSA requires financial institutions to maintain reports
or records useful in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations or pro-
ceedings, in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence
operations, and regarding international terrorism.17 The BSA was en-
acted out of concern for the increase in the use of financial institutions
to launder income used to finance criminal and terrorist activities.18
Like the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
11. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
12. Adam Fischer & James Sheppard, Financial Institutions Fraud, 45 Am. CRnM. L.




16. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5326, 5328-5330. The Currency and Foreign Transac-
tions Reporting Act is the formal name of what is now commonly known as the Bank
Secrecy Act. Id.
17. 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
18. Fischer & Sheppard, supra note 12, at 558.
572016
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:1:55
Anti-Terrorism Act,19 the BSA ensures that the financial services in-
dustry reports potential money laundering transactions.20
In 1970, Congress also passed the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").21 Cases arising under RICO in-
volve, but are not limited to, mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and
money laundering.22 Criminals adjudicated guilty of RICO violations
face longer jail sentences than if convicted only of the underlying crimi-
nal offense.2 3
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") targets insiders who manage, or attempt to
manage,- a financial institution in a fraudulent manner,24 and provides
for criminal as well as civil sanctions.2 5 Criminal defendants can face
fines of up to one million dollars or a prison term of up to five years.26
In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA").27 Under that act, publicly traded companies must meet cer-
tain accounting practices and impose certain internal controls, the
expectation being that more rigorous accounting standards will reduce
the fraudulent misrepresentations that lead to bank fraud.2 8 The
FCPA does not impose liability for commonplace accounting deficien-
cies such as technical or insignificant accounting errors.2 9 Individuals
who violate the accounting or internal control provisions can face fines
of up to five million dollars or imprisonment for a maximum of twenty
19. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, Title III. (2001).
20. Id. §§ 301-377.
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
22. Peter Johnstone & George Brown, International Controls of Corruption: Recent Re-
sponses From the USA and the UK, 11 J. FmN. CimME 217, 220 (2004).
23. Id. The criminal offenses that must be first violated in order to trigger a RICO
conviction are known as "predicate offenses" or "racketeering activities." A list of (replace
said with "these" or "the aforementioned") offenses is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (West 2017).
25. This duality of sanctions has raised concerns about double jeopardy. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.").
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(j).
27. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2000)),
amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3, 78ff (2000)), and the Interna-
tional Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302
(1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3, 78ff).
28. Id.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4).
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years.3 0 The maximum penalty for corporations is twenty-five million
dollars.3 1
To promote financial stability and reduce financial crime, coun-
tries across the world have shown a willingness to enact financial
regulations. Increased globalization3 2 in the late 1990s fostered in-
creased transnational expansion and deregulation of financial
markets.33 As countries moved toward removing restrictions on capital
transactions and banks assumed a more international dimension, the
potential for international financial crises caused by the destabilizing
effect of criminal activity and the movement of illicit proceeds has in-
creased.3 4 In 1997, the Asian banking turmoil was attributable in part
to a weak banking system and endemic bank fraud.3 5 If the honest
goal is preventing international financial crimes, then financial insti-
tutions, law enforcement, and regulators must exponentially increase
cooperation among them.3 6
In addition to expanding financial markets, globalization and
deregulation have also created a need for banks to adopt international
standards in addition to following domestic regulations.7 Interna-
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
31. Id.
32. See Dani Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1997, at 19, 22; George Soros, Toward a Global Open Society, ATLArIc MONTHLY,
Jan. 1998, at 20, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/98jan/opensoc.htm; Peter F.
Drucker, The Global Economy and the Nation-State, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Oct. 1997, at 159;
Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 429, 433-
39 (1997) (expressing the idea that globalization is moving into many kinds of industries
and service areas).
33. The liberalization of international trade and the development of technology fur-
thers the globalization of financial markets. The globalization of financial markets shapes
deregulation, promotes the removal of barriers, and enhances the flow of capital. See A. T.
Aburachis, International Financial Markets Integration: An Overview, INTERNATIONAL Fi-
NANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION 26, 37 (Stanley R. Stansell ed. 1993).
34. See Stephen L. Harris & Charles A. Pigott, Regulatory Reform in the Financial
Services Industry: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?, 67 OECD FIN. MKT. TRENDS
31, 41 (1997), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Managementloecd/finance-and-invest-
ment/financial-market-trends/volume-1997/issue-2_fmt-v1997-2-en (analyzing the global
liberalization of financial services).
35. See And South-East Asia Thinks It's All Over, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1997, at 41 (indi-
cating that one cause of Asia's financial crisis is the lack of an effective banking supervision
system rather than an unstable economic system).
36. See Survey of Banking in Emerging Markets, EcoNoMIsT, Apr. 12, 1997, at 17 (em-
phasizing the potential establishment of a financial cross-border patrol, similar to global
policing).
37. See Andrew Crockett, Global Capital Markets and the Stability of Banking and
Financial Systems, in BANKING SOUNDNESS AND MONETARY POLICY, ISSUES AND EXPER-
IENCES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 89, 91 (Charles Enoch & John H. Green eds., 1997).
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tional financial meltdowns and collapses38 have underscored the
importance of coordination and communication of information for fi-
nancial institutions and regulatory and enforcement authorities.39 The
challenge is to devise global banking standards that promote accounta-
bility, international financial integration, transparency, and security
while respecting privacy in bona fide transactions and political and ter-
ritorial boundaries.40 From this focus on international rather than
domestic regulations, international financial standards (commonly
known as "soft law") have arisen.41 In this case, soft law allows banks
38. See Michael P. Malloy, Financial Institutions and Regulations, The S & L Crisis:
Death and Transfiguration: Foreword: . . . and Backward: Death and Transfiguration
among the Savings Associations, 59 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1 (1991) (banking regulators realized
the importance of banking supervision through a series of international banking scandals,
which started with the American $50 billion savings and loan disaster in the late 1980s);
Colin P.A. Jones, Japanese Banking Reform: A Legal Analysis of Recent Developments, 3
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 387, 430 (1993) (Japan's bad-debt mountain). See generally ETHAN
B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND THE STATE
155-76 (1994) (renowned financial banking collapses have included Luxembourg's Bank of
Credit and Commerce International in 1990); Symposium, The Transformation of French
Corporate Governance and United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1
(1995) (discussing France's Credit Lyonnais' $4 billion loan loss); Andrea M. Corcoran, Mar-
kets Self-Assessment and Improvement of Default Strategies after the Collapse of Barings, 2
STAN. J. L Bus. & FrN. 265, 265-271 (1996) (discussing British Barings' ill-advised deriva-
tives deals); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The Mexican Crisis: Who Should be a Country's
Lender of Last Resort?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1769 (1995) (discussing the Mexican crisis in
1995).
39. See RICHARD DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEREGULATION: THE GREAT BANKING
EXPERIMENT 15 (1992).
40. The World Trade Organization's ("WTO") negotiations on financial services con-
cluded successfully on December 12, 1997 after 70 WTO Members reached a multilateral
agreement o open their financial services sectors. The landmark agreement brings trade in
this sector-worth trillions of dollars-under the WTO's multilateral rules on a permanent
and full most-favored nation basis. The agreement covers more than 95 percent of trade in
banking, insurance, securities and financial information. The results of the latest round of
talks are part of a protocol which will be open for governments to accept until January 29,
1999. See WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO ACHIEVED LANDMARK AGREEMENT ON FINANCIAL SER-
VICES 1-2 (1997), https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/focus_e/focus25_e.pdf.
41. Soft law refers to a set of legal terms or informal duties adopted under formal or
informal treaties or multilateral agreements. The emergence of soft law results from the
inadequacy of hard law, which cannot overcome deadlocks in international relations that
result from economic or political differences. A soft law's guidelines will presume consent to
basic principles of law or convention, especially in rapidly developing fields such as interna-
tional financial regulation or free trade. Based on these characteristics, a soft law is defined
as an international rule created by a group of specific national authorities and adopted into
their nations' laws or administrative codes. Notably, once a country implements a soft law's
principles, the soft law often attains legally binding force and becomes hard law within that
country. As an example, a soft law may be used to allow banks from different countries with
different domestic banking regulations to work together under one set of international
banking standards. Due to the nature of a soft law, the banks of two different nations may
do business with one another without one insisting that the other follow an unfamiliar for-
eign law. Because of this advantage, international banking regulators recognize the benefit
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from different countries with different domestic banking regulations to
work together under one set of international banking standards. Banks
of different nations may now do business with one another without in-
sisting the other follow unfamiliar foreign law. This advantage has
accelerated the acceptance of soft law in establishing a global banking
supervisory regime.
The main promoter of soft law has been the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision ("Basel Committee") formed in 1974.42 The Basel
Committee did not draw international attention until the early
1980s.4 3 Its charter was designed to achieve an international agree-
ment on the proper standards for banking supervision.4 4
The Basel Committee's recommendations became known as the
Basel Accords. These are recommendations on how to properly super-
vise financial transactions. As soft law, they lack the binding force of
of soft law in establishing a global banking supervisory regime. The term hard law defines a
signed treaty or agreement which is precisely worded and specifies the exact obligations
undertaken or the rights granted. See C.M. Chinkin, Abstract, The Challenge of Soft Law:
Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & CoM-P. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989).
42. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("Basel Committee") was estab-
lished at the end of 1974 at the Bank for International Settlements at Basel, Switzerland.
The Basel Committee is endorsed by the Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten (now
eleven countries) comprised of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland plus Lux-
embourg. The goal of the Basel Committee is to achieve an international agreement on
standards of good practice and collaboration in international banking supervision. Addition-
ally, the Basel Committee has created a body of recommended banking supervisory
standards, known as the Basel Accords ("Basel Accords"). However, since the Basel Accords
lack legal validity or binding force, the effective enforcement of the Basel Accords depends
on each authority's enforcement. See ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, SUPERVISING INTERNATIONAL
BANKS: ORIGINs AND IMPLICATIONS OF BASLE AccoRD 185 (1991).
43. While the media often identifies the countries participating in the Basel meetings
as the G-10, eleven countries were actually present: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and West Ger-
many. The Basel Committee was established at the end of 1974 at the Bank for
International Settlements at Basel, Switzerland. The Basel Committee is endorsed by the
Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten (now eleven countries) comprised of Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and Switzerland plus Luxembourg. The goal of the Basel Committee is to
achieve international agreement on standards of good practice and collaboration in interna-
tional banking supervision. Additionally, the Basel Committee has created a body of
recommended banking supervisory standards, known as the Basel Accords. However, since
the Basel Accords lack legal validity or binding force, the effective enforcement of the Basel
Accords depends on each authority's enforcement. See id.
44. Lawrence Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Bank-
ing Supervision, 39 Va. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1998). The Basel Committee is endorsed by the
Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten which is comprised of Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States, plus the countries of Luxembourg and Spain. Id.
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hard law.4 5 The Basel Committee also worked to raise the level of
awareness of the interdependence among financial institutions and fi-
nancial supervisors. This mutual dependency has developed close
personal contacts and has greatly helped the handling and resolution
of problems affecting particular financial institutions. In part because
of this success, the Basel Accords have become widely accepted in the
international financial arena.
Included in the Basel Accords are recommendations designed to
improve banks' "early-warning" systems to discover the potential risks
of a system-wide financial crisis. Such systems include monitoring of
capital adequacy, currency movement and consolidation, internal risk
management supervision, information exchange by bankers and regu-
lators alike, and international financial regulations. The Basel Accords
also promote competitive quality among banking institutions from dif-
ferent nations by systematizing capital requirement analysis.46 The
Basel Accords recommend stringent supervisory measures for financial
institutions. They attempt to reduce the risk of banking failures and to
minimize competitive inequality among the different nations' banking
regulations. 4
The Basel Accords have become the standard for trans-national
financial services regulations throughout the industrialized world, and
often play a vital role in the enactment of national legislation.4 8 Recent
revisions of the Basel Accords prod financial institutions to have robust
risk management programs to reduce the risk of internal and external
fraudulent behavior.49 Not only have the Basel Accords have been
adopted in the European Union ("EU") and the United States, but also
in over a hundred other countries including India, Thailand, Hong
Kong, Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand.50
45. Lee, supra note 44, at 7.
46. See JOHN H. FRIEDLAND, THE LAw AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL SYSTEM 187, 189-90 (1994) (describing that the Basel Committee strengthened banking
supervision and created competitiveness for international banking operations through vari-
ous compliance methods).
47. See W. Peter Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations: Evolving
Techniques for Cooperation Among Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG.
244, 246 (1981) (summarizing the Basel Concordat).
48. Id. at 6.
49. See Tarisa Watanagase, Governor, Bank of Thailand, Mitigating Fraud in Finan-
cial Institutions 1-2 (Apr. 29, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.bis.org/review/
r080429d.pdf).
50. Lee, supra note 44, at 28. See Daniel E. Ho, Abstract, Compliance and Interna-
tional Soft Law: Why do Countries Implement he Basle Accord?, 5 J. or INr'L ECON. L. 647
(2002).
62
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Due to the accelerated trend toward globalization of banking ac-
tivities, the Basel Committee, in addition to the Accords, developed
guidelines for banks operating in foreign countries. These focus on the
respective roles of the home and host country in ensuring adequate fi-
nancial supervision. The guidelines were issued as the Basel
Concordat of 1975 (the "Concordat").5 1 It sets five basic principles52
outlining the responsibilities of home and host countries' regulators in
the monitoring of international institutions.53 The Concordat recom-
mends that the home country's supervisory authority be primarily
responsible for the solvency of the home country's bank, and leaves the
supervision of liquidity to the host authorities.54 Because of the need
for the exchange of information within the foreign bank and the coop-
eration between the host and home countries' supervisory authorities,
51. Cooke, supra note 47, at 246.
52. The Basel Concordat of 1975 provided five basic principles to banking regulators
for international banking supervision. They are as follows:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments hould be the joint responsibility of
host and parent authorities;
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each country should en-
sure that foreign banking establishments are supervised, and supervision should be
adequate as judged by both host and parent authorities;
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host authorities since
foreign establishments generally have to conform to local practices for their liquidity man-
agement and must comply with local regulations;
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be essentially a matter for the
parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary responsibility lies with the host
authority, parent authorities should take account of the exposure of their domestic banks'
moral commitment in this regard; and
(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of information between host and
parent authorities and by the granting of permission for inspections by or on behalf of par-
ent authorities on the territory of the host authority. Every effort should be made to remove
any legal restraints (particularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty)
which might hinder these forms of cooperation. Id.
53. The Basel Concordat was a set of guidelines on bank supervision reached by con-
sensus among banking regulators from many nations. The Basel Committee entitled the
document a "concordat" to indicate that the agreement did not have the legal force of a
treaty. See COMMIITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, BS/75/44e,
REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTs (1975)
(the original Basel Concordat was not released to the public until March 1981). See R. C.
WILLIAM & G. G. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS 29-32 (1981) (reproducing the original Basel Concordat, which was
released to the public in March 1981, as an Annex (Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establish-
ments)), reprinted in Revised Basel Concordat, Principles for the Supervision of Banks'
Foreign Establishments, 22 I.L.M. 900, 900-908 (1983) [hereinafter The Committee Report]
(The Revised Concordat of 1983 was circulated in April 1990, as well as in July 1992).
54. The Concordat takes this approach because foreign financial institutions generally
have to conform to and comply with local regulations and practices for their liquidity man-
agement. See Autar Krishen Koul & Mihir Chatterjee, International Financial Institutions
and Indian Banking: A Legal Profile, 2 INDIA INT'L L. 207, 209 (2008).
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the fifth principle of the Concordat recommends abolishing the re-
straints on the transfer of information.
The Committee recognized the need to develop more specific su-
pervisory standards.5 5 As a result, the Committee in 1983 enacted the
Basel Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign
Establishments (the "Revised Concordat").5 6 The Revised Concordat
established more detailed principles for the allocation of bank regula-
tory responsibilities between home and host authorities.5 7 In an effort
to ensure that no bank operating in a foreign country would escape
adequate supervision, the Revised Concordat developed the concepts of
"consolidated supervision",58 and "dual key" supervision.59
Consolidated supervision expands the home country's regula-
tory authority responsibilities. The home country's regulators are
required to monitor the total risk exposure and capital adequacy of the
home country's bank by reviewing the bank's total operations. Where a
home country has inadequate supervision, the Revised Concordat pro-
poses two options: the host country can deny entry approval, or the
host country can impose specific conditions governing the conduct of
the foreign bank's business.60 "When a host country does not have ade-
quate supervision, the Revised Concordat urges the home country's
regulatory authorities to discourage the home country's bank from ex-
panding operations into the host country."61 The rationale behind the
dual key approach is to prevent countries from lowering supervisory
practices in order to attract foreign investment and capital.62
55. The Committee recognized this need after the financial crisis that arose from the
sovereign debt crisis that occurred in Latin America and the financial scandal which in-
volved Banco Ambrosiano. Kern Alexander, The Basel Committee and Global Governance,




58. "Consolidated supervision" means monitoring the risk exposure (including the con-
centrations of risk, the quality of assets, and the capital adequacy) of the banking groups for
which the home authority bears responsibility, on the basis of the totality of the business,
wherever conducted. See The Committee Report, supra note 53, at 905.
59. "Dual key supervision" means that the regulatory authority of each nation concur-
rently assesses the other's ability to supervise and carry out its respective responsibilities.
Alexander, supra note 55.
60. According to the Revised Concordat, he primary purpose of the Basel Committee is
to examine the totality of each bank's worldwide business on the basis of consolidated super-
vision. See The Committee Report, supra note 53.
61. Alexander, supra note 55, at 8-9.
62. See id. at 9.
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II. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
The U.S. Federal government's ability to undertake or assume
responsibility over an expanding catalog of criminalized conduct is
questionable. There are reports stating that the Congressional Re-
search Service cannot account for the current number of federal
crimes.63 The American Bar Association reported in 1998 that there
were in excess of 3,300 separate criminal offenses.64 More than forty
percent of these laws have been enacted in just the past thirty years as
part of the growth of the regulatory state.65 And these laws are scat-
tered in over fifty titles of the United States Code, encompassing
roughly 27,000 pages.66 Worse yet, the statutory code sections often
incorporate, by reference, the provisions and sanctions of administra-
tive regulations promulgated by various regulatory agencies.
Estimates of how many such regulations exist are even less well set-
tled, but the A.B.A. thinks there are nearly 10,000.67 The appetite for
more federal criminal laws is driven principally by political considera-
tion,68 and not by any consideration of whether particular laws are
intrinsically federal in nature.69 The growth of public welfare offenses
will, therefore, be restrained only by a public or court system educated
as to the need for restraint. Nor is the growth in the number of federal
criminal statutes merely an academic question, without real world ef-
fects. To the contrary, between March 2001 and March 2002, federal
prosecutors commenced 62,157 cases, involving 83,809 individual de-
63. Before the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce Subcomm. on Emp'r-Emp.
Relations Regarding Union Reporting and Disclosure: Legislative Reform Proposals - Con-
sideration of H.R. 4054 and H.R. 4055 (2002) http://archives.republicans.edlabor.house.gov/
archive/hearings/107thleer/1mrdatwo62702/rosenzweig.htm.
64. J. A. Strazzella, Federalization of Criminal Law, AM. BAR Ass'N 91 app. C (1998),
https*//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/criminaljustice/Federalization
ofCriminal Law.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Symposium, Federal Criminal Code Reform:
Past and Future, 2 BUF. Clum. L. REv. 46, 53 (1998) [hereinafter Federal Criminal Code].
65. STRAZZELLA, supra note 64, at 7-9.
66. Federal Criminal Code, supra note 64, at 53.
67. STRAZZELLA, supra note 64, at 10.
68. JAMEs D. CALDER, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POL-
Icy, 20-24, 198-203 (1983) (describing events leading to enactment of criminal laws in the
1920s and early 1930s); See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized
Crime: A Tale of Two Thieves, 543 ANNALS Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 27, 30 (1996) (re-
counting events leading to passage of federal carjacking legislation).
69. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal
Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 15, 20-21 (1996).
652016
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:1:55
fendants.70 More than 3,100 of these defendants were charged with
crimes categorized as violations of "federal statutes" - a category
broadly congruent with charges reflecting violations of a regulatory
program.7' This number exceeds the number of federal prosecutions
during the same year for a host of traditional criminal law offense cate-
gories, including murder, robbery, embezzlement, bank fraud, forgery,
and sex offenses.72 Put another way, more federal resources are in-
vested in regulatory prosecutions than in the prosecution of
embezzlement charges.73
This continued trend of over-criminalization will further siphon
off investigatory and prosecutorial resources into nontraditional crimi-
nal areas, leaving financial institutions on their own and powerless to
deal with fraud. Rather than trying to solve the bank fraud problem by
relying on the government's resources, financial institutions should re-
quest authorization to exercise some of the government's investigatory
powers. Judicious use of these powers will allow financial institutions
to make an informed decision of whether civil legal action is warranted
or financially justified.
Once a financial institution determines that legal action is war-
ranted and is financially justified, it proceeds to litigation under a
statute similar to Florida's Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act
("Act"). 74 Under the Act, any financial institution that proves by clear
and convincing evidence that it has been injured in any fashion by the
commission of two or more connected predicate offenses or by a theft
may recover threefold the actual damages sustained.7 5 It may also re-
cover reasonable attorney's fees and court costs in the trial and
appellate courts.76 In awarding attorney's fees and costs under the Act,
the courts cannot consider the ability of the defendant to pay such fees
and costs.7 7
70. Table D-2-U.S. District Courts - Criminal Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics,
U.S. CTS. (Mar. 31, 2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-2/federal-judicial-
caseload-statistics/2002/03/31.
71. Id. at Table D-3.
72. Id.
73. All categories pale, however, in comparison to the principal area of federal effort-
the prosecution of drug offenses, which resulted in more than 32,000 individuals being
charged. Id.
74. See FLA. STAT. §§ 772.101 - 772.19 (2008).
75. FLA. STAT. § 772.11(1).
76. Id.
77. Because of the initial "probable cause" determination by an independent and im-
partial judge or magistrate, the notice requirement of the Act should be rescinded.
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III. PRE-FILING TRACKING OF ASSETS
Once a debtor has absconded with funds, the creditor will seek
repayment of the fraudulent loan. Locating assets of debtors is often
one of the most difficult areas of asset recovery. Asset transfers have
become common.78
Creditors will certainly want to know whether sufficient assets
exist prior to spending the money necessary to bring an action against
a debtor. Sometimes, the level of "indebtedness does not warrant the
expenditure of legal and accounting fees to pursue the matter aggres-
sively."79 It would not make sense to spend substantial sums of money
if there are minimal chances of recovery. Therefore, determining
whether sufficient assets exist to cover the loss and costs of obtaining a
judgment and making a recovery is an essential question that must be
addressed prior to filing suit.80
With the ubiquitous personal computer and internet access, it is
possible to search hundreds of public records databases across the
world.8 1 Fraudulently obtained funds are often used to purchase prop-
erty in the debtor's name, in the spouse's name, or in the names of
friends or relatives.82 Many times, titles to real and personal property
must be recorded and may be located in public records' databases.83
Another starting point are the statements and records submitted along
with a loan application.84 Debtor-submitted bank statements may re-
veal other accounts or movement of funds offshore.85 Cancelled checks
can also lead to hidden assets by showing where funds are being di-
rected.86 Debtors may attempt to conceal assets by purchasing
insurance policies, annuities or bearer instruments, or may place the
funds in another financial institution's safe deposit box.8 7
Regardless of the above-mentioned alternate discovery avenues,
financial institutions will need enabling legislation in order to do effec-
78. Richard P. Finkel & Dominic Fulco, III, Financial Statements, The Revealing Story
on Hidden Assets, 13-10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 15 (1994).
79. Id. at 21.
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tive pre-filing discovery."" Pre-filing discovery is not novel or
revolutionary. The government, in exercising its investigatory powers,
has the authority to engage in extensive pre-filing or pre-charging dis-
covery by providing incentives for information and through the use of
"probable cause" search warrants, grand jury subpoenas, and/or ad-
ministrative subpoenas.9 A financial institution that finds itself a
victim of fraud could be permitted to obtain "disclosure orders" after
establishing probable cause to an independent and impartial judge or
magistrate. These disclosure orders would be the creature of statute,
and by statutory fiat would fall under the same body of law that govern
"probable cause" search warrants. Judicial oversight should prevent or
minimize abuse, while allowing financial institutions to decide
whether further civil legal action is warranted or financially justified.
IV. POST-FILING OF ASSETS
A number of agreements allow residents of one country to ob-
tain information on residents of another country post-filing for use in
litigation or arbitration. Some of these agreements are covered below
as a non-exhaustive list.
A. The Hague Convention
Established in 1970, the Hague Convention ("Convention") pro-
vides for a system that facilitates the transmission of requests for
taking evidence via central authorities designated by each party to the
88. Because it is often overly burdensome to collect information at the outset of the
loan process, financial institutions should consider obtaining a general authorization
(granted for consideration) to review financial records pre-and post-loan. Said authorization
should be drafted to allow the creditor to obtain information from other financial institu-
tions, businesses and individuals. The creditor will find that without an authorization it is
difficult if not impossible to obtain debtor-related financial information from third parties.
Even with a debtor's authorization, there may still be limitations on obtaining the informa-
tion needed. Absent a court order, privacy concerns prohibit third parties from conducting
pre-or post-loan discovery about a debtor and its assets. See, e.g., The Right to Financial
Privacy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000); Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the process-
ing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
89. An important tool in the government's investigatory arsenal is the ability to pay or
provide consideration in exchange for information. There is no logical reason why defrauded
financial institutions, after a determination of probable cause, should be prohibited from
paying or providing consideration in exchange for information. Just like in the criminal
arena, the ability to pay for information in the civil arena wil promote a fraud-free financial
environment by driving fraudsters and tricksters out of the market place.
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convention.9 0 An important limitation to the availability of the Con-
vention is Article 23, which states that a contracting state may declare
that it will not execute letters of request issued for the purpose of ob-
taining pre-trial discovery of documents.9 1 Accordingly, obtaining
evidence in many countries may only be permitted once litigation has
started. This limitation defeats the Convention's utility to determine
the feasibility of post-litigation recovery.
Requests for taking evidence under the Convention are for-
warded by the central authority in the requestor's country to the
central authority of the country where the evidence is to be taken.9 2
The receiving central authority will then transmit the request to the
appropriate judicial body to execute the request.9 3 Although forty-four
countries are parties to the Convention,9 4 those signatory countries,
part of the EU, have agreed among them to be bound by a different
agreement.9 5
A letter of request, unless otherwise agreed to by the originat-
ing and executing states, must specify:
1. The authority requesting its execution and the authority re-
quested to execute it (if known);
2. The names and addresses of the parties to the proceeding
and their representatives, if any;
3. The nature of the proceedings for which the evidence is re-
quired; and
4. The evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be
performed.
Where appropriate, the letter must also specify:
1. The names and addresses of person to be examined;
2. The questions to be put to the persons to be examined or a
statement of the subject-matter about which they are to be
examined;
90. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters art.
23, July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
91. Id. at art. 23.
92. Id. at art. 1.
93. Id. at art. 2.
94. The contracting parties to the Convention included Argentina, Australia, Barba-
dos, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.
95. This EU agreement will be discussed later. See Infra, pg. 18.
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3. The documents or other property, real or personal, to be
inspected;
4. Any requirement that the evidence is to be given under oath
or affirmation and any special form to be used; and
5. Any particularly special method or procedure to be
followed.96
The letter of request must be written in or translated into either
1. the language of the executing authority,
2. English, or
3. French.97
A state is permitted to require that a letter be in a specified
language, and may refuse a letter written in another language.98 A
state that receives a request that is not in the appropriate language
may have the letter translated and charge the costs thereof to the
originating state.9 9 With the exception of fees paid to experts and inter-
preters, the actual execution of the letter will not give rise to any
reimbursement of costs.100
Furthermore, if the executing authority does not feel that the
letter complies with the requirements of Article 3, it must promptly
inform the originating authority of its objections.101 Execution of a let-
ter of request may be refused only to the extent that the letter does not
fall within the jurisdiction of the judiciary, or when the executing state
believes that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced.102 If the
letter of request is transmitted by the executing authority to a party
incompetent to execute it (i.e., a court not having jurisdiction over the
person to be examined), the letter must be sent to a party that is com-
petent to do so.1 0 3 If the letter of request is not executed in whole or in
part, the requesting authority will be informed immediately and ad-
vised of the reasons for non-execution.10 4
Members of the original state's judiciary and the parties to the
proceedings may be informed as to the time, date, and location of the
examination and may be permitted to attend the taking of evidence if
96. 23 U.S.T. 2555 art. 3.
97. Id. at art. 4.
98. See 23 U.S.T. 2555 art. 4. This includes English and French, even though the use of
them is permitted by the Convention. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at art. 14.
101. Id. at art. 5.
102. Id. at art 12.
103. See 23 U.S.T. 2555 art. 6.
104. Id. at art. 13.
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the law of the executing state permits.105 The party executing the re-
quest should apply its own laws as to the methods and procedures,
including the appropriate methods of compulsion. The executing party
should, however, follow any requests by the originating authority re-
garding methods and procedures so long as they are consistent with
local laws.106
The party requested to provide evidence may refuse to do so in-
sofar as they have a privilege or duty to refuse to give evidence under
the laws of the state of execution or under the laws of the state of ori-
gin. The privilege or duty must either be specified in the letter of
request or confirmed by the requesting authority to the executing
authority.1 0 7
While the Convention theoretically provides an avenue for the
discovery of assets in foreign jurisdictions, the effort and cost to serve
letters of request from one nation to another are only feasible if a credi-
tor suspects or knows that assets exist in a particular jurisdiction. Use
of the Convention is not suited for blanket searches to locate hidden
assets.
B. Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements
1. Europe
The EU replaced the Convention with another regulation in
2001 concerning cooperation between the courts of member states in
the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters ("Regulation").108
The Regulation was meant to simplify the taking of evidence in mem-
ber states and create a uniform process for the taking of such
evidence.109 The application of the Regulation has improved, simpli-
105. 23 U.S.T. 255 art. 7 and 8.
106. See 23 U.S.T. 2555 art. 9-10.
107. Id. at art. 11.
108. Council Regulation 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 On Cooperation Between The Courts
Of The Member States In The Taking Of Evidence In Civil Or Commercial Matters, art. 21,
2001 O.J. (L174/1) ("This Regulation shall .. . prevail over ... the Hague Convention of 18
March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters . . . .") The
Regulation has been accepted by all EU members, with Denmark as the only exception. The
members of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slo-
venia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. There are three candidate countries who
would likely be required to abide by the regulation if admitted to the European Union.
These countries are Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey.
109. Id. at § 2.
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fled, and accelerated the cooperation between the courts of the various
EU countries on the taking of evidence.110 For example, instead of re-
quiring that documents be sent from one country's central authority to
another country's central authority, as required by the Convention, the
Regulation allows for the courts in one country to directly request the
taking of evidence from a court in a different country.1 1 ' This differ-
ence thus simplifies the process of obtaining evidence by making it
more efficient and expedient. Also making the process more efficient is
Council Decision 2001/470/EC, signed into law the same day as the
Regulation. The Council Decision established a European Judicial Net-
work ("Network") to assist in the facilitation of requests between
member states.1 1 2 The Network facilitates contacts between the au-
thorities of the member states, organizes regular meetings, and
establishes a system of public information on judicial cooperation.
The Regulation can be used to obtain evidence pre- or post-com-
mencement of judicial proceedings.113 The Regulation also calls for
specific forms to be used uniformly throughout the member states.1 14
The forms for requesting the taking of evidence require that the re-
quest "contain the following details:"
1. the requesting and the requested courts;
2. "the names and addresses of the parties to the proceedings;"
3. the nature of the case and a "brief statement of the facts;"
4. "a description of the taking of evidence to be performed;"
5. if a person is to be the subject of the request, "the name(s)
and address(es) of the person(s) to be examined, the ques-
tions to be put to the person(s) .. . ,a reference to any rights
to refuse to testify" (privilege or duty) under the law of the
requesting court's country, and any requirement that the
testimony "is to be carried out under oath or affirmation",
and
6. if the request is for any other form of taking of evidence,
"the documents or other objects to be inspected."115
110. Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee on the application of the Council Regulation (EC)
1206/2001 of 28 May 2001.
111. Id. at art. 2.
112. See Council Decision (EC) No 2001/470 of 28 May 2001 Establishing a European
Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. L174/25, 25. The official web-
site for the European Judicial Network is http://ec.europa.eulciviljustice/index-en.htm. The
Network meets at least once every six months.
113. Council Regulation (EC) 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 at art. 1.
114. Id. at art. 4.
115. Council Regulation 1206/2001, supra note 108, art. 1 (EC).
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Similar to the provisions of the Convention, any requests for the
taking of evidence under the Regulation must be made in the language
of the requested country.116 When a request cannot be completed be-
cause it does not contain the information requested above, the
requested court shall inform the requesting court of the deficiencies
within thirty (30) days of receipt of the request.117 If the request is
complete, it should be executed expeditiously and completed no later
than ninety (90) days after receipt.I' If the requested court is unable
to execute the request within ninety (90) days of receipt, it must inform
the requesting court of its delay.119
If the request form contains the required information, a re-
quested court can only refuse to take evidence when: (1) the request
does not pertain to a civil or commercial matter; (2) the execution of the
request does not "fall within the functions of the judiciary" of the coun-
try of the requested court; or (3) the requesting court has not paid the
costs of experts or translators within sixty (60) days of the request of
payment by the requested court.120
The execution of a request to take evidence may not be refused
on the ground that the requesting country's court has exclusive juris-
diction over the matter, or that the law of that country would not admit
the right of action on it.121 If refusal of the execution request is war-
ranted, the requested court must notify the requesting court of its
refusal within sixty days of receiving the request.1 2 2
The parties to the proceedings, as well as representatives of the
requesting court, have a right to attend the taking of evidence by the
requested court.123 The parties also have a right to conduct the taking
of evidence directly, instead of having the evidence gathered by the re-
quested court, so long as the direct taking of evidence is not contrary to
the fundamental principles of law in the requested court's country.124
2. Central and South America
In January of 1975, a number of Central and South American
countries met in Panama to establish the Inter American Convention
116. Council Regulation 1206/2001, supra note 108, art. 5.
117. Id. art. 8, §1.
118. Council Regulation 1206/2001, supra note 108, art. 10 (EC).
119. Id. art. 15.
120. Id. art. 14, §2.
121. Id. art. 14, §3.
122. Id. art. 14, §4.
123. Id. art. 11, 12.
124. Id. art. 17.
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on the Taking of Evidence Abroad ("CIDIP I"). 125 This convention was
eventually signed by eighteen countries.126 CIDIP I established a
framework applicable to letters rogatory for the purpose of taking evi-
dence or obtaining information abroad in civil or commercial
matters.127
CIDIP I requires that the letters rogatory contain:
1. "[a] clear and precise statement of the purpose of the evidence
requested;
2. [c]opies of the documents and decisions that serve as the basis
and justification of the letter rogatory ... [;]
3. such interrogatories and documents as may be needed for its
execution; [and
4. the] [niames and addresses of the parties to the proceeding, as
well as of witnesses, expert witnesses, and other persons in-
volved and all information needed for the taking of the
evidence."128
The requesting procedure must not be contrary to local public
policy.1 29 The interested party must remit any financial means neces-
sary to comply with the request to the authority of the requested state.
The letters rogatory must be legalized or be transmitted by consular
agent, diplomatic agent, or through the designated central author-
ity.130 Lastly, the letters rogatory must be translated into the language
of the requested state, and the request must comply with procedural
laws and rules of the requested state.1 3'
The responding state may refuse to carry out the letter rogatory
if contrary to applicable law,132 public policy, 133 or if the request is
125. CIDIP is an acronym for the Spanish term Conferencia Inter-Americana de Derecho
Internacional Privado, which means the Inter-American Conference of Private Interna-
tional Law.
126. Signatories include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. However, CIDIP I has not been ratified
by Bolivia, Brazil, or Nicaragua.
127. Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, Jan. 30, 1975, 1438
U.N.T.S. 389, art. 2. Department of International Affairs, Inter-American convention on
convention on letters rogatory, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/dill
CIDIPI convention evidenceabroad.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
128. Id. art. 4.
129. Id. art. 16.
130. Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 127, art.
13. The term legalization refers to the certification as to the authenticity and legitimacy of
documents, typically by the affixation of a seal on the letters rogatory by the requesting
country.
131. Id. art. 10.
132. Id. art. 6.
133. Id. art. 16.
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made for pretrial discovery purposes.134 The unavailability of pretrial
discovery in some countries makes it substantially more difficult to de-
termine whether litigation against an insolvent debtor is financially
prudent. Likewise, a person called to give evidence may refuse to do so
under an impediment exception or duty to refuse under the law of ei-
ther country.135
Compliance with a letter rogatory under CIDIP I does not imply
ultimate recognition of the issuing authority's jurisdiction or a commit-
ment to recognize the validity of the judgment in the relevant
matter.136 Nor does compliance imply enforcement of any award.137
The execution of a letter rogatory and the execution of a judgment are
deemed to be two entirely different matters. Accordingly, even though
a letter rogatory may not be recognized, a subsequent judgment may
still be enforceable in that jurisdiction. The Convention and the Regu-
lation do not permit the taking of evidence to give rise to any
obligations of payment, with the exception of costs to obtain experts or
to translate documents.138 CIDIP I, to the contrary, specifically calls
for the costs to be borne by the party requesting the evidence.139
In May 1984, thirteen countries adopted the Additional Protocol
to the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
(CIDIP 111140 or the "Additional Protocol").141 The Additional Protocol
was designed to strengthen and facilitate international cooperation in
judicial procedures as provided for in CIDIP 1.142
CIDIP III specifies that a letter rogatory must be processed if it
meets the following criteria:
134. Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 127, art.
9.
135. Id. art. 12.
136. Id. art. 8.
137. See id.
138. Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 127, art.
8.
139. Id. art. 7.
140. CIDIP II took place in May of 1979. However, CIDIP II involved the validity of
foreign judgments. Private International Law, DEP'T OF INT'L L., http://www.oas.org/dil!
CIDIPII home.htm.
141. The Additional Protocol was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. However, only Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela have ratified and are
bound by the Additional Protocol. See Department of International Law, Signatories and
Ratifications, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/
b-51.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2017).
142. See Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 127.
Information on the Additional Protocol is available at, Department of International Law,
supra note 141.
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1. "The proceeding(s) have been initiated.
2. The documents are reasonably identified by date, contents, or
other appropriate information.
3. The letter rogatory specifies those facts and circumstances
causing the requesting party reasonably to believe that the re-
quested documents are or were in the possession, control, or
custody of, or are known to the person from whom the docu-
ments are requested."143
Likewise, the person from whom documents are requested may
deny that it has possession, control, or custody of the requested docu-
ments, or may object to the production or copying of the documents.144
CIDIP I and the Additional Protocol, like the Convention, call
for the transmission of documents between countries through desig-
nated central authorities which are typically diplomatic governmental
offices. 14 5 The central authority of each country is responsible for re-
ceiving letters rogatory from requesting courts and also for delivering
letters rogatory to their courts in order to fulfill the requests.146 Sub-
ject to the laws of the country of destination, the parties in the
proceedings may attend the execution of the letter rogatory. 4 7 While
there is no cost for the processing of the letters rogatory by the central
authorities or by its judicial authorities, the destination central or judi-
cial authority may seek payment for services that are required to be
paid directly by the party requesting the evidence in accordance with
local law.1 48 Furthermore, the destination judicial authority shall
honor any requests as to special procedures to be followed unless the
procedures are incompatible with the fundamental principles of law or
the mandatory rules of the country of destination.149 The additional
requirement that evidence be taken only for proceedings that have
been commenced eliminates the allowable pre-filing discovery origi-
nally permitted by CIDIP 1.150 This restriction effectively precludes the
use of discovery in order to determine the practicality of initiating liti-
gation against the debtor.
143. Department of International Law, supra note 141, art. 16.
144. Id. art. 16.
145. Department of International Law, supra note 141, art. 3.
146. Id.
147. Id. art. 5.
148. Id. art. 6.
149. See id. art. 15.
150. Id. art. 16.
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3. Africa
Judicial cooperation among the region's members is still in its
infancy. While there is no treaty among the African nations regarding
the taking of evidence in sister states, a number of countries have
shown a willingness to work together.
In 1993, the Treaty on Harmonization of Business Law in Africa
was signed into law by sixteen countries.151 The Organization for the
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa ("OHADA"), 152 was a direct
result of this treaty. OHADA's purpose is to standardize the law as it
relates to business transactions in the member countries.15 3 The judi-
cial cooperation brought about by uniform application of business law
may eventually cross over into other areas of law. The Common Court
of Justice and Arbitration, a permanent body of OHADA, rules on mat-
ters of treaty and uniform act interpretation and has high court
jurisdiction on all business law disputes.154 OHADA is tasked with cre-
ating uniform business laws, directly applicable and enforceable in all
OHADA member states, which laws take precedence over domestic
law.15 5 By enacting regional legislation confirming the supremacy of
OHADA in matters of business law, Africa is paving the road for an
economic community.
In 1999, a treaty was signed establishing the East African Com-
munity ("EAC"). The EAC currently has six members. Their common
goal is to enhance cooperation in various areas, including in the judi-
cial arena.15 6 Appropriately, the EAC treaty established the East
African Court of Justice, a judicial body created to promote a uniform
interpretation and compliance with the treaty.15 7 Like OHADA, the
EAC treaty requires that the judgment of the court take precedence
151. The current members are the countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Equatorial Guinea, Mali, DR Congo, Niger, Senegal, Chad, and Togo. See OHADA, http://
www.ohada.org/index.php/fr/ (last visited Sep. 20, 2017).
152. OHADA is an acronym for the French phrase "Organisation pour l'Harmonisation
en Afrique du Droit des Affaires", meaning the Organization for the Harmonization in Af-
rica of Business Law. Id.
153. Treaty on Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, art. 1, http://
www.ohadalegis.com/anglais/traiteharmonisationgb.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
154. Id. art. 3, art. 14.
155. Id. art. 5 & 10.
156. The members of the EAC are currently Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, South
Sudan, and Burundi. See EAST AFRICAN COMMUNTTY, https://www.eac.int/eac-organs (last
visited Sep. 20, 2017).
157. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community art. 23 & 27,
Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255.
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over the rulings of national courts.15 8 The EAC treaty calls for the
standardization of law in order to create a seamless judiciary between
the partner states.59
The enactment of community judiciaries for OHADA and the
EAC indicates that discovery requests from one party under the re-
spective treaties would be honored in the courts of another member
state. Any difficulties in obtaining discovery would be reviewed by the
treaty-created high court.
4. Hong Kong and China
In 2006, Hong Kong and China reached an agreement regard-
ing reciprocal enforcement of judgments.160 However, there is still no
agreement in place regarding the taking of evidence between the par-
ties. Nonetheless, Macao and Hong Kong, as a Special Administrative
Region of China, are signatories to the Convention.16 1 Therefore, the
provisions of the Convention may be applicable between the two judi-
cial systems. However, the numerous exclusionary provisions of the
Convention could be used as grounds to deny discovery requests be-
tween the two states.
C. Safe Havens
Notwithstanding the numerous regional agreements permitting
discovery, there remain a number of countries that act as "safe havens"
for those assets that debtors wish to put beyond the reach of their cred-
itors. 1 6 2 Debtors will often establish offshore asset protection trusts
("OAPT") to shield funds from creditors in these particular countries.
Debtors establish these OAPTs because the legal environment favors
158. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community art. 33, Nov. 30,
1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255.
159. Id. art. 126, § 2(b).
160. Id. art. 33.
161. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kutac, Reallocating the Burden of Persuasion Under the Air-
ospatiale Approach to Transnational Discovery, 24 REV. LITIG. 173, 179 n.19 (2005); Randy
Wilson & Suyash Agrawal, Practical Issues When Litigating the Trans-Border Dispute in
Texas, 70 TEx. B. J. 130, 132 n.20 (2007).
162. The "safe haven countries" include the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, the
Channel Islands, the Bahamas, the Isle of Man, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands,
Turks, Caicos, St. Kitts, Nevis, Lichtenstein, Mauritius, and Barbados. See Stewart E.
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1035,
1037 (2000); Susanna C. Brennan, Comment, Changes in Climate: The Movement of Asset
Protection Trusts from International to Domestic Shores and Its Effect on Creditors' Rights,
79 OR. L. REv. 755, 766 (2000); David D. Beazer, The Mystique of "Going Offshore", 9 UTAH
B. J. 19, 19-20 (1996).
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the debtor and makes it relatively easy to shield funds from credi-
tors.16 3 The use of an OAPT is not illegal.164 However, the fraudulent
conveyance of assets into an OAPT is illegal in most countries.16 5
Before determining whether the conveyance of the assets is legal, the
critical issue that must be resolved first is whether the assets have
been moved into an OAPT.
The safe haven countries are generally not signatories to any
treaties or agreements with regard to the taking of evidence.166 Their
laws often make it a criminal offense to disclose any information re-
garding the settlors, beneficiaries, trustees, or assets of the trust.1 6 7
Accordingly, banks and individual trustees are reluctant to disclose
any information regarding an OAPT. Any requests to a safe haven
country's judiciary would likely be found contrary to said country's
public policy. 168
Moreover, the trusts themselves often contain flight clauses and
anti-duress clauses which are enforced by the safe haven country's
courts.1 6 9 A flight clause calls for the transfer of the assets to another
jurisdiction if any event threatens the trust or its assets.170 Examples
of events that could threaten a trust include the commencement of
creditors' actions, unfavorable changes in the law of the governing loca-
tion, or the entry into a treaty with another country that lessens the
protection of the OAPT. 171 Once assets are discovered by the creditor,
the trustee will move the assets to another jurisdiction and the credi-
tors must start the process of locating the assets all over again.
Anti-duress clauses are often used when the settlor retains
management or control over the trust.172 An anti-duress clause per-
mits the settlor to remove and replace a trustee in the event that the
trustee becomes subject to coercive measures designed to force the
163. See generally Sterk, supra note 162, at 1048. See also Stacey Lee, Piercing Offshore
Asset Protection Trusts in The Cayman Islands: The Creditors' View, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. 463,
480 (1998).
164. Brennan, supra note 162, at 765.
165. Id.
166. The only exception is that Barbados has agreed to the provisions of the Hague Con-
vention in matters with Singapore and Australia. However, the discovery of information
pertaining to offshore asset protections trusts would be contrary to the fundamental princi-
ples of law in Barbados and evidence would not be able taken regarding those trusts. Id.
167. See generally Lee, supra note 163, at 495.
168. See generally id.
169. Id. at 477-79.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 479.
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trustee to repatriate the assets to an unfavorable jurisdiction.173 Ac-
cordingly, the creditor may not be able to require the trustee to deliver
any information regarding the trust as the trustee would no longer
have access to the information.
While there are a number of agreements and treaties between
countries allowing for the taking of evidence in other jurisdictions,
debtors will often move assets between jurisdictions that do not have
evidence agreements in order to make it substantially more difficult to
locate the assets. Even between countries that have enacted evidence
agreements, many countries require that litigation be commenced
before parties can request discovery. Such jurisdictions will not permit
discovery merely to determine whether litigation would be cost effec-
tive. Creditors would be required to initiate litigation in order to
determine whether any assets exist and, if so, where the assets are
located. The expense involved in commencing litigation where there is
only a suspicion of assets could result in the needless expenditure of
funds that could be better utilized elsewhere.
Lastly, even where litigation has commenced and assets are
tracked to a particular jurisdiction, various legal systems view the dis-
covery process differently. What would be acceptable in one
jurisdiction may be contrary to the public policy or fundamental princi-
ples of law in another, thereby eliminating or, at a minimum, reducing
the effectiveness of the discovery request. While a court's request for
evidence may not be given effect in another jurisdiction, the foreign
jurisdiction may still honor an authorization by the debtor to release
information to the creditor. However, even this authorization may be
deemed contrary to the public policy, and therefore unenforceable.
V. ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AGAINST ASSETS OVERSEAS -
THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS
After a judgment has been entered, the creditor faces the diffi-
cult task of enforcing it against the assets of the debtors. A judgment is
only enforceable in the jurisdiction in which it is granted unless it is
specifically recognized in a foreign jurisdiction.1 7 4 Therefore a number
173. Lee, supra note 163, at 479.
174. An exception to this rule are judgments obtained from a United States District
Court. These can be enforced by any other United States District Court anywhere in the
United States, its territories or possessions, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Judgments from the courts of one state in
the United States, its territories or possessions, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico can be enforced by the courts of another
state of the United States, its territories or possessions, the Commonwealth of the Northern
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of treaties and agreements call for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments between countries.
In 1971, the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the
"1971 Convention") was concluded.175 However, it was ratified by only
four countries, three of which have since renounced it.176 Although it
never became law, it still gives insight into possible solutions to the
problem of enforcing judgments in foreign courts.
In 2005, the international community again tried to find a solu-
tion to the problem of enforcing judgments in foreign courts by drafting
the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the "2005 Conven-
tion"). 177 Because of the failure of the 1971 Convention to gather
signatories, the 2005 Convention limited jurisdictional concerns by ap-
plying the provisions of the conventions only to judgments from a court
agreed upon by the parties.178 Thus the 2005 Convention requires con-
tracting states to enforce only the judgments of an agreed-upon court.
Even after this major concession and more than three years after its
drafting, only one country is a party to it.179
Both the 1971 and the 2005 Conventions require that the judg-
ment be rendered by a court having proper jurisdiction and that said
Mariana Islands or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico only after said judgment has been
domesticated before the enforcing court. See generally Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of
Foreign Money Judgments and the Need for Reform, 14 U.C. DAvis J. INr'L & POL'Y 111
(2007).
175. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Feb.1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, http://www.hech.net/index-en.php?
act=conventions.pdf&cid=78 [hereinafter Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments].
176. The convention was originally signed by Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Kuwait. Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 UNTS 271,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=79 [hereinafter Supple-
mentary Protocol]. Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Portugal denounced their participation in
the convention when they signed Brussels I. Infra p. 32. Accordingly, Kuwait, which ac-
ceded to the convention on May 8, 2002, is the only party still a signatory to the convention.
See Supplementary Protocol, supra note 176.
177. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M.1294,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?actconventions.text&cid=98 [hereinafter Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements].
178. See id.
179. Mexico acceded to the convention on September 26, 2007. HCCH, 2005 Choice of
Court Convention to enter into force on 1 October 2015 following the approval by the Euro-
pean Union, HCCH (June 25, 2015), https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/
?varevent=412.
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judgment be final.180 Both Conventions prohibit the enforcing court
from reviewing the judgment sought to be enforced on its merits,181
and both allow the refusal of enforcement if; the judgment is contrary
to public policy of the enforcing state; the judgment is procured by
fraud; the defendant was not notified of the proceedings; or the notice
does not comport with the concept of due process in the enforcing
state. 182
Additionally, the 2005 Convention denies enforcement of a judg-
ment awarding compensatory, exemplary, or punitive damages that do
not compensate a party for actual loss suffered.183
Under the 1971 and the 2005 Conventions, a party seeking en-
forcement of a judgment must submit:
1. A complete and certified/authenticated copy of the
judgment.
2. All documents required to establish that the judgment is fi-
nal and conclusive in the original jurisdiction.
3. The originals or certified copies of the documents establish-
ing that the defendant was duly notified of the proceedings,
if the judgment was rendered by default.
4. A certified translation into an official language of the en-
forcing court, if the judgment is not in the official language
of the enforcing state.1 a4
While neither of these two Conventions have any force at pre-
sent, some of their provisions have been integrated into the various
regional agreements discussed below. They have also laid the frame-
work for other international agreements.
A. Europe
In December of 2000, the EU established a regulation ("Brus-
sels I") that expanded on the Brussels Convention of 1968 on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
180. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcements of Foreign Judgments, supra
note 175, at art. 4; Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 177, at art. 8, §4
& art. 9.
181. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note
175, at art. 8; Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 177, at art. 8.
182. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note
175, at art. 5 & 6; Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 177, at art. 9.
183. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 177, at art. 11.
184. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note
175, at art. 13; Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 177, at art. 13.
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cial Matters (the "Brussels Convention").1 85 Brussels I governs the
jurisdiction of the EU courts in commercial and civil matters.186 It re-
quires that a judgment given in one member state be recognized
automatically in another member state. The recognizing jurisdiction
cannot review the judgment for its merits, and must be enforced imme-
diately. However, the foreign judgment may be reviewed:
1. for legal authenticity,
2. for in personam jurisdiction,
3. to determine if the judgment to be enforced is manifestly
contrary to the enforcing state's public policy,
4. to determine if the doctrine of estoppel requires non-
enforcement,
5. if there is a prior judgment that is res judicata vis-a-vis the
judgment to be enforced, or
6. to determine if the defendant was not given sufficient time
and notice to allow the defendant to arrange for his
defense.187
In order to submit a judgment for recognition or enforcement, a
party must produce a copy of the judgment and include a certificate of
authenticity from the court of the member state where the judgment
was given.188 The procedures to apply for enforcement are governed by
the law of the state in which enforcement is sought.8 9 No legalization
or other similar formalities are required of the judgment or certificate
presented.190 As long as a settlement is approved by the court in the
litigation jurisdiction, and is enforceable in said jurisdiction, they are
enforceable in the courts of other member states.191
In 2007, a council decision (the "Lugano Convention of 2007")
extended the provisions of the Brussels Convention to Norway, Iceland
and Switzerland. The Brussels Convention, as the precursor to Brus-
sels I, contained substantial similarities to the provisions of Brussels I.
185. See Council Regulation 44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000, Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L12) 3
(EC). Denmark was not a party to the regulation until July 1, 2007 when an agreement
between Denmark and the European Union, entered into in October of 2005, went into
effect.
186. Id.
187. See Council Regulation 44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000, Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 33, 34, 36, 41, 57.
2000 O.J. (L12) 3 (EC).
188. See id. art. 53, 54.
189. See id. art. 40.
190. See id. art. 56.
191. See id. art. 57 - 58.
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Neither the Brussels Convention nor Brussels I apply to bankruptcy
proceedings or their judgments.192 Accordingly, if a creditor hopes to
use a judgment to attach assets held in other member states, it must
bring suit against the debtor directly and not through insolvency
proceedings.
In the United Kingdom, a creditor may be able to obtain a freez-
ing order at the onset of litigation as a protective measure against the
debtor's attempts to transfer the assets beyond the reach of the
court.1 9 3 A freezing order is directed to the debtor personally and does
not operate as an attachment or create security rights over the debtor's
assets.194 A worldwide freezing order prohibits a debtor from removing
its assets or reducing the value of the assets below the amount indi-
cated in the order.195
In order to obtain a freezing order, a creditor must establish
that:
1. it has a strong case for an amount certain or for an amount
that can be reasonably estimated,196
2. the debtor must have assets either within the jurisdiction or
outside the jurisdiction if the local assets are insufficient to
meet the amount of the claim,197 and
3. there is an actual risk of dissipation of the assets if the or-
der is not granted.198
If the freezing order is granted, the creditor may apply for recognition
of the order in other member states.
Third parties in England must comply with the freezing order if
they have notice of it.199 Foreign parties will be affected by a recog-
nized order only to the extent that it is enforced in the foreign
jurisdiction.200 However, due to the spirit of judicial cooperation in the
EU, the order can be used to hold assets in place in a member state
while litigation is pending. The threat of imprisonment for failing to
192. See Brussels Convention, art. 1; see also Brussels I, art. 1, § 2(b).
193. Laurence Katz, United Kingdom: Asset Tracing: Getting Evidence and Injunctive
Relief, MONDAQ. (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=57338 (last





198. Laurence Katz, United Kingdom: Asset Tracing: Getting Evidence and Injunctive
Relief, MONDAQ. (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=57338 (last
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abide by the freezing order is a deterrent to the transfer of assets be-
yond the reach of the courts and creditors.201
B. Central and South America
In 1979, a number of Central and South American countries, as
members of the Organization of American States ("OAS"), signed the
Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Montevideo, Uruguay ("CIDIP
II").202 CIDIP II lays the framework for the recognition of judgments in
the courts of member states to the convention. Judgments, awards, and
decisions are valid only if they meet a number of conditions.2 0 3
1. The judgments must fulfill all the formal requirements nec-
essary for them to be considered authentic in the country
that granted the judgment.2 0 4
2. The judgments and any accompanying documentation must
be final, translated into the language of the country in
which they are to be enforced, and duly legalized according
to the laws of the enforcing state.2 0 5
3. The court rendering the judgment must be deemed compe-
tent to try and pass judgment on the matter according to
the laws of the country of enforcement.2 0 6
4. The debtor against whom enforcement is sought must have
been summoned in a manner substantially equivalent to
that accepted by the enforcing jurisdiction
5. The debtor must have been afforded the opportunity to pre-
sent its defense to the action.207
201. Katz, supra note 198.
202. Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1211, 1224-27. The countries that signed the con-
vention are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela. However, it has only been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Multilateral Trea-
ties, DEP'T OF INT'L L., OAS, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-41.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2017).




207. Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards, supra note 202, art. 2.
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6. The judgment must not be contrary to the principles and
laws or the public policy of the enforcing country.208
The enforcing state's laws, not the rendering state's laws, gov-
ern the procedures for ensuring the validity of a foreign judgment.209
Where two countries have different legal systems, what is adequate in
one country to obtain the judgment may not be adequate in another to
enforce the judgment. Alternatively, complying with the procedures
called for in the country where enforcement is sought may result in
dismissal for failure to follow proper procedures in the jurisdiction
where the litigation is pending. In order for any resulting judgment o
be enforceable, creditors must follow the procedures called for by both
countries.
The judgment to be enforced must be accompanied by a number
of documents to prove its validity. The creditor must submit a certified
copy of the judgment and of the documents proving that the debtor was
not denied due process (i.e., proof of summons or subpoena) and that
the debtor had an opportunity to present a defense, and a certified copy
of the mandate stating that the judgment is final or has the force of res
judicata.210 If portions of the judgment are contrary to public policy or
laws of the enforcing state, the judge or tribunal may agree to its par-
tial execution if requested by the creditor.211
The most problematic issue in CIDIP II is the requirement hat
the court issuing the judgment be competent to hear and rule on the
matter. Because of numerous "subject matter" jurisdictional disputes
among member states, the Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction
in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments ("CIDIP III") was signed.212 CIDIP III severely limits the
ability to obtain enforcement of foreign judgments. CIDIP III requires
the individual debtor to actually reside or be domiciled in the territory
of the state in which judgment was rendered.213 If the debtor is a legal
entity or business organization, then its principal place of business
208. See id.
209. Id. art. 6.
210. Id. art. 3.
211. Id. art. 4.
212. The current signatories to CIDIP III are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Note that Nicaragua is presently not a signatory to CIDIP II. Furthermore, six
parties to CIDIP II did not participate in CIDIP III. These countries are Argentina, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. Multilateral Treaties, supra note
202.
213. Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Ex-
traterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, art. 1, May 5, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 468.
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must be in the territory where the judgment was rendered.2 1 4 While
serving the defendant in the state that rendered the judgment was suf-
ficient under CIDIP II, this practice is no longer enough under CIDIP
III. Also, if the action involves rights to personal or real property, the
real or personal property must itself be found within the territory of
the state in which the judgment is rendered.2 1 5
CIDIP III does not apply to cases involving bankruptcy, insol-
vency proceedings, assignments for the benefit of creditors, or torts.2 1 6
CIDIP III has only been ratified by Mexico and Uruguay.
C. North America
1. The United States
The United States has not entered into any treaties or agree-
ments with other countries for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments.2 1 7 The principal stumbling block appears to be the percep-
tion by many foreign states that money judgments granted by U.S.
courts are excessive and contrary to the public policy of the country
expected to recognize and enforce the U.S. judgment.2 1 8 Therefore, the
issue of whether a foreign court would enforce a U.S. judgment de-
pends on the laws and policies of the foreign country and on
international comity.2 1 9 If a party anticipates enforcing a U.S. judg-
ment abroad, it should obtain foreign counsel prior to filing the
complaint.2 2 0 Any failure to abide by the foreign court's interpretation
of due process may result in the non-recognition of the U.S. judg-
ment.221 Brazil, Switzerland and France will refuse to enforce "a
judgment against their nationals unless there is a clear indication that
[the] national[s] intended to submit to the [U.S.] court's jurisdic-
214. Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. Id. art. 6.
217. Enforcement of Judgments, TRAVEL.STATE.Gov, https://travel.state.gov/content/
travellen/legal-considerations/judicial/enforcement-of-judgments.html (last visited Sep. 20,
2017).
218. Id.
219. Comity has been defined as "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
220. Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 217. See also, Waller, Under Siege: United
States Judgments in Foreign Courts, 28 Tex. Int'l L.J. 427, 434 (1993).
221. Waller, supra note 220, at 429.
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tion."222 Furthermore, a number of states, including the Nordic
countries, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia, will refuse to recognize
a decision absent the existence of a judgment convention between the
"rendering" and "recognizing" jurisdictions.2 2 3
The U.S. does not treat foreign judgments with the same dis-
dain as its judgments are treated abroad. A party seeking to enforce a
foreign judgment in the U.S. must file it in a U.S. jurisdiction. The U.S.
court then determines whether to give effect to the foreign judg-
ment.2 2 4 Normally, these courts are quite liberal in enforcing foreign
judgments.225 To be recognized, the foreign judgment must be final,
conclusive, and enforceable in the jurisdiction in which it was
rendered.226
U.S. courts, however, will not recognize a judgment if it is ren-
dered without providing the defendant due process of law.2 2 7 A
judgment does not provide due process if:
1. the judgment was rendered under a system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
the requirements of due process, or
2. the foreign court does not have personal or subject matter
jurisdiction.228
There is a presumption in favor of the rendering court having jurisdic-
tion, and it is the debtor's burden to rebut it.229
Furthermore, U.S. courts have discretion to refuse recognition
of the foreign judgment if:
1. the debtor did not receive notice of the proceedings in the
foreign court with sufficient time to present a defense;
2. "the judgment was obtained by fraud;"
222. Yuliya Zeylanova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, BERKELEY J. INT'L L., 150, 165 (2013), https://
www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/4571.pdf; see also Office of the Chief Counsel for In-
ternational Commerce, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments, DEP'T OF
Com., http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/refmj.htm (last visited July 8, 2008).
223. Id.
224. Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 217.
225. Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce, supra note 222.
226. Id.
227. See generally Luthin, supra note 174, at 117 ("Despite the disjointed procedures for
enforcement, the United States is generally considered one of the most receptive nations in
recognizing and enforcing Foreign Money Judgments.").
228. See Luthin, supra note 174, at 119-120.
229. See generally the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, §7 (1962)
(adopted, in some form, by thirty-two U.S. states as of January 11, 2008).
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3. the foreign cause of action is repugnant to U.S. public
policy;
4. "the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;"
5. there is an agreement between the parties that calls for res-
olution through a means other than proceedings in the
foreign jurisdiction; or
6. the foreign court is a highly inconvenient forum if jurisdic-
tion is based solely on personal service.2 3 0
Recognition of a foreign judgment does not require that the
courts of a rendering country recognize U.S. judgments.2 3 1 A U.S. de-
termination that the foreign judgment is recognizable and enforceable
binds all other U.S. courts.232 However, if the foreign judgment is not
recognized by the court before which it is presented, that court's ad-
verse decision precludes recognition or enforcement of the foreign
judgment anywhere else in the U.S.
2. Canada
In Canada, foreign judgments, by themselves, do not have a
right to be recognized unless one of the various reciprocal enforcement
acts has been enacted by a province.233 The foreign judgment will only
be given effect if the court determines that the judgment satisfies the
rules of the forum in which recognition and enforcement is sought.2 3 4
Similar to U.S. courts, there has been a recent trend towards a more
230. Luthin, supra note 174, at 119.
231. Id. at 118 ("U.S. courts began either to abandon the reciprocity requirement, or to
use it as merely one factor in determining whether to enforce a judgment rendered in a
foreign country.").
232. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
233. Markus Koehnen & Nicole Vaz, MCMILLAN LLP, The Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Canada 1 (February 2002), http//www.langmichener.ca/Files/The
%20Recognition%20and%2OEnforcement%20of%20Foreign%2OJudgements
Koehnen_0202.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). See also, e.g., British Columbia's Court Order
Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996 Chap. 78 (establishing reciprocity with a number of U.S. and
Australian states, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom); Alberta's Reciprocal En-
forcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. R-6 (establishing reciprocity with three U.S.
states and the Commonwealth of Australia); Manitoba's Reciprocal Enforcement of Judg-
ments Act, C.C.S.M. c. J20 and Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Regulations, MAN.
REG. 319/87 R (establishing reciprocity with a number of Australian states); and Prince
Edward Island's Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1998, c. R-6 (estab-
lishing reciprocity with Washington State (USA)).
234. Id.
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liberal recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.235 Canadian
courts will generally enforce a foreign judgment unless:
1. it was obtained by extrinsic fraud;
2. it violates Canadian public policy;
3. it is contrary to the ideals of natural justice;
4. it is for the payment of taxes or penalties;
5. it is granted under the foreign sovereign's "public laws"; or
6. it violates sovereign immunity.2 3 6
Extrinsic fraud, unlike intrinsic fraud, does not relate to the
merits of the case, but instead has to do with fraud committed by the
court hearing the action.2 3 7 Before it can become the basis for refusing
recognition of a foreign judgment, extrinsic fraud must be found to
have deprived the aggrieved party of an adequate opportunity to pre-
sent his or her case to the court.238 If evidence of the fraud was already
unsuccessfully presented to the foreign court, the debtor cannot make
the argument again in the Canadian court.239 Even when the debtor
was not aware of the fraud, if the fraud could have been discovered
with "reasonable" investigation, the foreign judgment will not be de-
nied recognition. As a basis for refusing to enforce a judgment, fraud
must be based on facts which came into existence after the foreign
judgment was rendered or where the facts could not have been discov-
ered through the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to the rendered
decision.240
A foreign judgment may be set aside if it is contrary to the no-
tions of "natural justice."241 Natural justice is similar to the concept of
due process in that a denial of natural justice generally relates to a
fundamental flaw in the proceedings, such as inadequate notice, the
right be heard, or bias on the part of the presiding tribunal.242 The
denial of natural justice must be pursuant to the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction and not by a violation of Canadian procedural rules.2 4 3
A judgment will not be enforced if it is for the payment of taxes
or penalties.244 Since penal and revenue laws are thought to be sover-




239. Id. See also Beals v. Saldanha, [19981 42 O.J. No. 4519 (Can.).
240. Koehnen & Vaz, supra note 233, at 18-19.
241. Id. at 1.
242. See Pyro-Air Ltee. v. Engelberg, 1990 CarswellOnt 2104 (Can. Ont. C.J.) (WL).
243. Beals, 42 O.R.3d 127.
244. Id.
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eign acts, the enforcement of those laws in a foreign jurisdiction
amount to permitting the foreign government to exercise its jurisdic-
tion in a Canadian forum.2 4 5 Punitive damages assessed against a
private debtor are not penal judgments because the penalty is payable
to an individual and not a foreign sovereign.2 4 6 If the penalty is going
to a foreign sovereign, then it is a penal judgment and unenforceable. If
the judgment is for compensatory damages payable to the foreign sov-
ereign, the judgment is not penal and will be enforced.2 4 7 Canadian
courts have not found treble damages penal and have enforced such
judgments.248
Similar to the restriction on enforcing penal or tax judgments,
Canadian courts will refuse to enforce judgments that relate to rights
that only a sovereign state can exercise.249 If only the foreign sover-
eign, and not its citizens, can bring the action, then it is a "public law"
and a judgment obtained under it will not be enforced in Canada.2 5 0
While a judgment may not be recognized or enforced if the judg-
ment is contrary to Canadian public policy, this defense is narrowly
construed and rarely applicable.251 A foreign judgment is denied recog-
nition on public policy grounds only where it violates some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the Canadian forum. 25 2 A for-
eign judgment will not be rejected simply because it is contrary to
Canadian law or because a Canadian court would have rendered a
more lenient judgment.253
If the debtor feels that the foreign court reached the wrong deci-
sion, the error must be raised in the foreign court and not in Canada.
Canada will not refuse to enforce a foreign judgment on the grounds
that the foreign court made errors as to law or fact.254 The correctness
of a foreign judgment is irrelevant to its enforcement.2 5 5
245. Beals, supra note 243.
246. See Huntington v. Attrill, [18931 A.C. 150 (Can.) (distinguishing between suits for
penalty between a private individual in his own interest and a suit by a government for the
vindication of law).
247. See United States v. Ivey, [1995] 26 O.R.3d 533, 548 (Gen. Div.); affirmed [19961 30
O.R. 3d 370 (Can.).
248. Koehnen & Vaz, supra note 233, at 9.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1.
252. Id.
253. See United States v. Ivey, [19951 26 O.R.3d 533; affirmed [1996] 30 O.R. 3d 370
(Can.).
254. Beals v. Saldanha, [1998] 42 O.R.3d 127, 132-33 (Can.).
255. Id.
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A foreign judgment is enforceable:
1. if it is final and conclusive;
2. if it is for a definite and ascertainable sum of money;
3. if it is not for taxes or penalties owed; and
4. if it is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.2 5 6
The test for competency will be satisfied if there was a real and
substantial connection between the foreign jurisdiction and the subject
matter of the proceedings or the debtor.257 The connection need only be
with the foreign state and not with the court which rendered the judg-
ment.258 Only foreign in personam judgments for a definite or
ascertainable amount of money are enforceable.259 Canada also re-
quires that a judgment be final and conclusive in order to be
enforceable. A judgment is final if the court which rendered the judg-
ment no longer has the power to modify, rescind, or vary the
judgment.260 Yet, even if the judgment is being appealed, or can still be
appealed, it is deemed to be final in Canada.261 While a final judgment
is being appealed, a Canadian court may stay enforcement proceedings
pending the conclusion of the foreign appeal.262
In the event the enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought in
more than one Canadian jurisdiction, the creditor must obtain recogni-
tion in each province.263 All Canadian provinces, with the exception of
Quebec, have established agreements where a judgment recognized in
one province is automatically recognized in the other.
In 1984, Canada and the United Kingdom entered into the Con-
vention between Canada and the United Kingdom for the Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters ("REJUKA").264 REJUKA's provisions are substantially simi-
lar to the provisions and procedures for reciprocal enforcement of
256. Beals, 42 O.R.3d at 132-33.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Koehnen & Vaz, supra note 233.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. McMickle v. Van Straaten, [19921 93 D.L.R.4th 74 (Can.); Four Embarcadero Cen-
tre Venture et al. v. Kalen, [1987] 59 O.R.2d 236 (Can.).
263. Id.
264. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements (U.K) Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R-6 [hereinafter
"REJUKA"]. REJUKA is the Ontario statute that brings into force in Ontario the Conven-
tion between Canada and the United Kingdom For The Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1984. It has been imple-
mented in each of the common law Canadian provinces and territories. See Canada-United
Kingdom Civil and Commercial Judgments Convention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C.-30.
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judgments discussed above.265 REJUKA applies to judgments ren-
dered by the Federal Court of Canada and by all reciprocating common
law provinces and territories.266
D. Africa
1. OHADA
Judgments of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration are
binding on the courts of all member states.267 These judgments are
binding even if contrary to local law or public policy. 2 6 8 According to
the OHADA treaty, in no case may a decision contrary to a judgment of
the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration be lawfully executed in a
territory of a contracting state.269
Considering that one of the purposes of the OHADA treaty was
to guarantee legal stability of economic activities, it is unlikely that the
courts of a member state will refuse recognition and enforcement of
judgments from other member states.270 Only the decisions of the Com-
mon Court are binding on the member states and the court only hears
disputes regarding the interpretation and enforcement of the treaty.271
If a local court refused to recognize the judgment of another member
state's court, then such refusal could be appealed to the Common Court
as a violation of the policy and intent of the treaty. There are no provi-
sions in OHADA that require the recognition of the judgments from the
courts of non-member countries by the courts of OHADA members.
2. The East African Community272
Because EAC members want to build a cooperative economic
community, the courts of member states will likely recognize the judg-
ments rendered by other EAC members' courts. As such, the courts
would likely recognize and enforce the judgments of its EAC sister
265. Koehnen & Vaz, supra note 233.
266. Id.
267. Treaty establishing the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in
Africa, art. 10, OHADA http://www.ohada.com/traite.php (last visited July 7, 2008).
268. Id.
269. Id., art. 20.
270. Id. at preamble.
271. Id. art. 14.
272. East African Community Treaty, Preamble, Nov. 30, 1999 3-5 [hereinafter EAC
Treaty], http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/enltreaties/text.jsp?fileid=173330 (recognizing
failures of previous EAC and desire for economic development in region).
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states. If a local court refused to recognize the judgment of another
member state's court, then the refusal to recognize the judgment could
be appealed to the East African Court of Justice.273
3. South Africa
Even though South Africa has not entered into any formal
agreements with other countries regarding the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments, it recognizes foreign judgments under
certain conditions. South African courts will enforce a foreign judg-
ment if the rendering court had jurisdiction under South African
law.2 7 4 There are three grounds for establishing such jurisdiction:
1. Jurisdiction is appropriate if the defendant resided in the
territorial area of the court when the action commenced.275
2. Jurisdiction exists if the defendant submitted to the court's
jurisdiction, such as by defending the matter in the foreign
court.2 76
3. Jurisdiction exists if the defendant was within the territo-
rial area of the court when the action started.277
The first two grounds of jurisdiction are very limiting, as debt-
ors of all nationalities have a tendency to flee when the threat of
litigation looms. 2 7 8 The third basis for jurisdiction is of recent vintage,
and opens a door that was previously closed to foreign creditors.279 For-
eign courts are now deemed competent to pass judgment on the matter
if the debtor was in the area of foreign jurisdiction when the action was
initiated.28 0
Meeting the jurisdictional requirement is only the first obstacle
in enforcing a judgment in South Africa. The foreign judgment, like in
most other jurisdictions, must be final in the sense that the rendering
court cannot alter or modify it.281 Even though appealable in the origi-
nal jurisdiction, the foreign judgment is still enforceable in South
Africa.
273. East African Community Treaty, supra note 272, 23.




277. See Richman v. Ben-Tovim 2007 (2) SA 283 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
278. Id.
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Regardless of the jurisdictional issue, the foreign judgment can-
not be contrary to the public policy of South Africa or contrary to the
rules of natural justice to be enforced.282 This means that the debtor
must have had notice of the proceedings and afforded the opportunity
to present a defense.283 In order to conform to standard notions of "nat-
ural justice," the rendering tribunal must have been impartial in
reaching its judgment.28 4
South Africa's Protection of Businesses Act of 1978 restricts the
types of foreign judgments that can be enforced.285 The enforcement of
foreign judgments arising from product liability cases or the export of
materials is prohibited.286
E. Asia
1. China and Hong Kong
In July of 2006, the People's Republic of China and the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region entered into an agreement for the
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters.287 After a court in Mainland China or Hong Kong
enters a final judgment, any concerned party may apply to the Main-
land's People's Court or a court in Hong Kong for enforcement of the
judgment.288 With the enactment of the agreement, Hong Kong became
the first jurisdiction in the World whose court judgments are recog-
nized in Mainland China.289
There are, however, a number of restrictions in the agreement.
These limit the ability to have a judgment recognized in the other ju-
risdiction's courts.
The agreement only applies to judgments that have been ren-
dered pursuant to a written contract by the parties in which either a
court in the Mainland or a court in Hong Kong is designated as the
282. Wakefield, supra note 274.
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. Protection of Businesses Act 99 of 1978 (S. Afr.), https://www.thedti.gov.za/busi
ness-regulation/acts/protection-act.pdf.
286. Id.
287. lain C.L. Seow, China: Arrangements for Reciprocal Enforcement of Commercial
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court to have sole jurisdiction for resolving the dispute.290 In order to
avail themselves of the comity offered by the agreement, the parties
must ensure that such a forum selection clause is incorporated into
their contract. Also, the agreement only covers money judgments and
cannot be applied to final judgments granting some form of injunctive
or other equitable relief.2 9 1
The judgment must be final. To be final, the judgment must be
granted by a District Court or higher in Hong Kong or by the Interme-
diate People's Courts or higher in China.292 If the judgment is being
appealed in Hong Kong or a retrial for new evidence is underway, the
enforcement is stayed pending the outcome of the appeal or retrial.293
If either party is an individual, the application for enforcement
must be brought within a year of the judgment being rendered.294 If
both parties are business entities, the limitation period is only six
months.295
In addition to the above, there are a number of additional
grounds for refusing enforcement.
1. The choice of court agreement is invalid under the law of
the place chosen by agreement of the parties where the orig-
inal trial was conducted.
2. The judgment has been fully executed.
3. The court of the place where enforcement is sought has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the case according to its laws.
4. The losing party has not been given sufficient time to de-
fend against the matter.
5. The judgment was obtained by fraud.
6. The court of the place where enforcement is sought has
made a prior judgment on the same cause of action.
7. Enforcement would be contrary to the social and public in-
terest of the Mainland or the public policy of Hong Kong.296
Prior to its enactment, lenders in Hong Kong were reluctant to
do business with debtors in China for fear they would not collect on
290. Seow, supra note id.
291. Id.
292. Certain judgments of the Basic People's Courts of China have been authorized to
adjudicate foreign civil and commercial matters. These judgments are also available for
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judgments in the event of a default.2 9 7 This is no longer the case. Now,
Mainland borrowers commonly seek Hong Kong lenders.
2. Japan
Article 118 of Japan's Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") lays out
the requirements for the recognition of foreign judgments. Under CCP
Art. 118, a final foreign judgment shall only be valid if:
1. the judgment is granted by a competent court;
2. the Japanese debtor received service or summons or ap-
peared without such notice;
3. the judgment of foreign court is not contrary to public order
or good morals;
4. the judgment is final;
5. the judgment is not for taxes, penalties or punitive dam-
ages; and
6. there is a "mutual guarantee."298
Japanese courts can grant an order for the payment of a certain
sum of money, the delivery of property, or the performance or non-per-
formance of a certain acts.299 This allows for relief beyond what is
typically allowed in other courts (in many jurisdictions foreign judg-
ments are often limited to money judgments). Like in Canada, a
judgment ordering the payment of taxes or penalties is not recognized
because they are not considered civil judgments.300 Likewise, a judg-
ment including punitive damages is not recognized or enforced because
it is contrary to public policy.301
Like in nearly all other countries, only those judgments that are
final can be recognized and enforced.302 A "final" judgment is one that
can no longer be appealed. Therefore, a judgment cannot be enforced
until the time in which to file an appeal has expired under the laws of
the foreign jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the debtor must receive notice of the litigation in
order for the foreign judgment to be recognized.303 It is unlikely, how-
297. Seow, supra note 287.
298. MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. Civ. PRo.] 1996 [hereinafter Japan C. Civ. Pro.], art.
118 (Japan).
299. See Japan C. Civ. Pro, art. 118.
300. See Koehnen & Vaz, supra note 233, at 6.
301. Craig I. Celniker et al., Litigation and enforcement in Japan: overview, PRACTICAL
LAw, Country Q&A 9-502-0319 (2012) (Tunitive damages are not allowed in Japan, and
punitive damages awards from other jurisdictions are not enforceable.").
302. Id.
303. Japan C. Civ. Pro., art. 200(ii).
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ever, that this requirement extends beyond the initiation of the
litigation and therefore may not require that the debtor be given an
opportunity to be heard.3 0 4 The service of summons, if not otherwise
agreed to by Japan in a treaty, requires compliance with the CCP.305
If a foreign judgment is obtained by fraudulent means, the judg-
ment is unenforceable because it will be deemed against the public
order.306 The Japanese courts can look not only to the text of the for-
eign judgment but also to the underlying procedural facts on which it is
based.3 07 Any foreign judgment that conflicts with a judgment of a Jap-
anese court over a case involving the same parties and facts is also
contrary to the public order.308 While there is no prohibition on insti-
tuting litigation in Japan and a foreign court at the same time, the
foreign judgment will not be enforced if the Japanese litigation is still
pending.309
The requirement of "mutual guarantee," means that reciprocity
is likely between the rendering nation and Japan.310 Reciprocity need
not be expressly provided for in a treaty or international agreement
between the two countries. It is sufficient if the "guarantee" is secured
under the statutory law, the case law of the foreign country, or found in
the judicial practices of the foreign country's courts.311
Under Art. 24 of the Civil Execution Law, a Japanese court can-
not review the trial facts found by the foreign court.312 Neither can the
parties allege any fact or facts existing but not raised before the foreign
court before the judgment was rendered.313 Since Japanese law does
not allow Japanese courts to go into the merits of a foreign judgment,
foreign judgments from courts of countries that allow review into the
304. See Celniker, supra note 301.
305. Id.




310. Id. art. 118(iv).
311. Japan C. Civ. Pro, art. 118(iv). Japan has found that the requirements for enforcing
foreign judgments in California, New York, Hawaii, and the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland
were more lenient than those of Japan and therefore allowed for reciprocity. The Japanese
courts refused to recognize a Belgian judgment because Belgium law allows Belgian courts
to review foreign judgments on the merits or substance of the judgment.
312. The trial facts are those findings made by the trial court on which it bases its con-
clusions of law and its judgment. The procedural facts reviewable under CCP Art 200(2) are
those that establish whether the service of the summons or other procedures initiating the
foreign case complied with the procedures, if any, prescribed by any applicable treaty be-
tween Japan and the foreign court's country or whether said initiating process is contrary to
CCP Art. 200(2). See id.
313. Id.
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merits on a foreign judgment will be will not be recognized or enforced
in Japan.3 1 4
F. The Middle East
Enforcing judgments in the Middle East poses special obstacles
often not found in other jurisdictions. There are two regional treaties
concerning the reciprocal enforcement of judgments, the 1983 Conven-
tion on Judicial Cooperation between States of the Arab League
("Riyadh Convention") and the 1995 Protocol on the Enforcement of
Judgments, Letters Rogatory, and Judicial Notices issued by the
Courts of the Member States of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council
("GCC Protocol").315
Both treaties generally call for each signatory to recognize the
judgment of a court of any other signatory where the court of the
originating state had proper jurisdiction over the case, and where the
judgment is final.3 16 Like most agreements regarding the reciprocal
enforcement of judgments, both the Riyadh Convention and the GCC
Protocol permit a state to refuse to recognize the judgment where it is
contrary to Islamic law, or the Constitution or the public order of the
recipient state.317 This "public policy" exception is often used by Middle
Eastern courts to refuse enforcement of foreign judgments.318
Islamic law is generally based on the Shari'a, which is a set of
laws prescribed in the Qur'an.3 19 Before a foreign judgment can be en-
forced, it must meet the requirements of the Shari'a.320 For example,
Islamic law forbids the granting of interest as part of a judgment.3 2 1
Accordingly, any judgment granting interest to a party is generally
void as repugnant to Islamic law.3 2 2 Islamic law also requires that the
314. Id. Japanese courts refused to recognize a Belgian judgment because Belgium law
allows the Belgian courts to review foreign judgments on the merits or substance of the
judgment.
315. Marwan Elaraby et al., Saudi Arabia: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Ar-






319. Mark Wakim, Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards in the Middle East, 21 N.Y. IN'r'L L. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
320. Elaraby, supra note 315.
321. Wakim, supra note 319, at 8.
322. Id. at 10.
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judge deciding a dispute must hear both sides.323 If the debtor default
is granted, the judgment will not be recognized as contrary to public
policy.
3 2 4
In Saudi Arabia, a party attempting to enforce a foreign judg-
ment must satisfy two requirements. First, the party must show that
the jurisdiction that is issuing the foreign judgment will reciprocally
enforce the judgments of the courts of Saudi Arabia.325 This alone has
proven to be a difficult hurdle to overcome. The Saudi courts have re-
fused to recognize judgments from foreign jurisdictions stating that
they will generally enforce Saudi judgments, but fail to guarantee reci-
procity for Saudi judgments.326 Furthermore, the issue of reciprocity is
examined on a case-by-case basis with no reference to prior cases.327 A
judgment from one country that was recognized in the past does not
mean that a judgment from the same jurisdiction will be recognized in
the future.
A creditor seeking enforcement must show that the foreign
judgment is consistent with Islamic law as enforced in Saudi Arabia.328
This requirement often cannot be met. Many commercial practices up-
held in common law and civil law jurisdictions are forbidden and
unenforceable under Islamic law.329 Accordingly, meeting the require-
ments of consistency with Islamic law and reciprocity is difficult, and
enforcing judgments in Islamic countries remains the exception rather
than the rule.3 3 0 If the target assets are held in a country that applies
Islamic law, the collection suit should be brought in an Islamic nation
with jurisdiction rather than attempting to enforce a foreign judgment.
G. Safe Havens
If the debtor has transferred his assets into an OAPT, the credi-
tor will face a difficult task of persuading the government to give
comity to the foreign judgment unless actual fraud can be proven.331
The laws allowing for enforcement are often varied by OAPT friendly
jurisdictions in favor of the trust settlor and against the creditor.332
323. Wakim, supra note 319, at 45.
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One way to obtain enforcement of a judgment against an OAPT
is to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtor in the
courts of the trust's jurisdiction.333 However, the bankruptcy laws in
these countries often require that the person be:
1. personally present in the jurisdiction;
2. ordinarily reside or have a place of residence in the
jurisdiction;
3. carry on a business in the jurisdiction; or
4. be a member of a firm or partnership which carries on a
business in the jurisdiction.334
Having assets in the jurisdiction alone is many times not sufficient to
allow for a bankruptcy petition.
Due to the likelihood that the foreign judgment will not be rec-
ognized in the OAPT's jurisdiction, it would be wise to commence
litigation in both jurisdictions simultaneously.335 For example, the
Cayman Islands apply common law rules in relation to the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.336 The Cayman Islands will
also require that the foreign judgment be (i) for a definite sum of
money, irrespective of taxes and penalties, (ii) final and conclusive, and
(iii) not impeachable by way of fraud, public policy, or natural jus-
tice.3 3 7 Additionally, the creditor must demonstrate that the debtor
was either physically present in the foreign jurisdiction at the com-
mencement of litigation, or that the debtor submitted to the foreign
court's jurisdiction.338 However, the Cayman Islands courts, like the
courts of many OAPT-friendly nations, may review a foreign judg-
ment's merits and refuse to recognize the judgment as contrary to its
laws and public policy.
The burden of proof often required in OAPT-friendly countries
is considerably higher than in most other countries. For example, the
Cayman Islands require that when a creditor attempts to pierce or
gain legal access to an OAPT, it must prove that the transfer of assets
into the OAPT was fraudulent.339 The standard to which the creditor
must prove the fraudulent transfer is beyond a reasonable. doubt
rather than the more common preponderance of the evidence standard
333. See Finkel & Fulco, supra note 78.
334. See Lee, supra note 163, at 481.
335. Id. at 492.
336. Id. at 483.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Lee, supra note 163, at 493.
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employed elsewhere.340 The creditor must prove intent to actually de-
fraud at the time of the transfer of assets.3 41 Proving such intent by
such a high standard is nearly impossible. Even if the creditor has a
strong case for showing an actual intent to commit fraud by the debtor,
the action must be brought within the statutory limitation period of six
years.342 Moreover, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
assets are transferred and not when the creditor discovers, or should
have discovered, the fraud.343
The Cayman Islands and other OAPT-friendly jurisdictions re-
quire that the losing party pay for the prevailing party's legal fees.3 4 4
Given the limited likelihood of success, it is clear to see why creditors
often do not bring suit in the Cayman courts. The same logic applies to
many of the other OAPT nations as well.
CONCLUSION
International organizations must accept the fact that there is
no current national or transnational statutory scheme that addresses
the very real need of bona fide private financial institutions before we
can have true globalization. If this occurs, there will be the ability to
trace the assets of debtors to determine the advisability of filing law
suits, to verify financial information given by prospective debtors in
loan application packages or to perform prospective client or transac-
tional due diligence. This inability to obtain information puts financial
institutions at a great disadvantage while trying to comply with ever
prevalent "know-your-client" regulations and avoiding doing business
with fraudsters, money launderers, and potential terrorists. True
globalization requires seamless, efficient and inexpensive pre and post
loan, pre and post filing, and post judgment transnational discovery,
and equally seamless, efficient, and inexpensive transnational enforce-
ment of all judgments. The present state of affairs is not acceptable. It
favors the unscrupulous debtors and allows them to keep their ill-got-
ten gains while putting bona fide private financial institutions at a
clear disadvantage.
340. Lee, supra note 163, at 493.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 493-94.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 496.
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